Technical insights, operational lessons learned, and industry perspectives from the Forge and Flight Academy instructor cadre. UAS operations, electronic warfare, autonomy, and training doctrine.
FFP-401 takes the Force Protection track from digital signature management into detecting and defeating physical surveillance. Technical surveillance countermeasures, direction-finding tradecraft, non-destructive entry, and safe-house/team-clearing procedures, built on FFP-201 and expected to open for scheduling Q4 2026.
Read More →A PACE plan that has never been run under disruption is a document, not a capability. The fallback procedures that matter most are the ones operators have actually practiced, including the ones that activate when the primary path is compromised, and what a live, graded PACE plan looks like in training.
Read More →Most personal security training ends with a supply list, tools to acquire, accounts to create, configurations to set up alone later. The problem is that operators do not complete the supply list. A fully configured, student-retained kit at graduation is the only model that produces a working security posture on Day 1 back at the unit.
Read More →De-Googled Android and mobile device hardening are terms that appear in personal security guidance without explanation of what they actually involve, what they protect against, and what they do not protect against. Here is what the process looks like in practice.
Read More →A personal threat model is not a checklist. It is a structured reasoning process that produces decisions specific to a person's actual risk profile, what they protect, from whom, how likely each threat is, how bad the consequence, and how much security friction they will actually sustain. Annual OPSEC training produces none of this.
Read More →Most units calculate the cost of a UAS program as the acquisition cost of the platform. The actual cost includes contractor support contracts, downtime during attrition recovery, and the compounding readiness penalty of a program that cannot sustain itself. The math is not close.
Read More →A unit that completes FFF-411 does not produce pilots. It produces operators with functional FPV employment skills, field repair capability, and the ability to sustain the program without contractor support. Here is what that actually looks like in practice.
Read More →Most UAS programs are structured around acquisition, not sustainment. The result is a single component failure away from mission stoppage. Building organic repair capability is the fix, and it starts with training.
Read More →Electronic warfare is the leading cause of UAS mission failure in contested environments. Why most training programs don't address it, what the gap costs operationally, and how to close it before your program deploys.
Read More →At an April 2026 Senate hearing, SOCOM's commander said building electronic-warfare-realistic training ranges in the United States is the training investment he would prioritize with more resources. The gap is real, and it exists at every level of the force, not just special operations.
Read More →In late April 2026, 82nd Airborne paratroopers at Fort Bragg conducted hands-on FPV drone-on-drone training as part of the Pentagon's counter-UAS initiative. What they learned, why the Army is investing in it, and what it means for unit training officers across the force.
Read More →Part 107 certification created a dangerous misconception: that a certified operator is a trained operator. Here's what the certification actually covers, and the gap agencies need to address.
Read More →Agencies are spending six figures on UAS platforms and five figures on operator training. That math doesn't work, and the gap is producing underutilized fleets.
Read More →Electronic warfare is the leading cause of UAS mission failure in contested environments. What the gap looks like, why most training programs don't address it, and how to fix it.
Read More →AI-enabled UAS is no longer a future capability, it is being deployed now. Commanders who do not understand what autonomous systems can and cannot do in contested environments are making decisions with incomplete information.
Read More →Military UAS experience does not automatically qualify you for commercial drone operations under FAA rules. Part 107 certification matters for veterans, transitioning service members, and active duty personnel working in dual-use environments.
Read More →Most UAS programs are one component failure away from mission stoppage. The fix is not a better warranty, it is training operators to repair and sustain their equipment in the field without contractor support.
Read More →